When environments are 'rich', single-valued social choice functions which are implementable in Nash strategies are implementable in dominant strategies. Moreover the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem of implementation in dominant strategies has been extended to differential economic environments. Therefore it is important to study implementation for non-rich environments. We characterize for quasi-linear utility functions mechanisms which are implementable in dominant strategies (providing a generalization of the Groves-Clarke mechanisms) and in Nash strategies. This second type of mechanisms differ from the first only by the types of transfers they allow. Properties of these mechanisms such as balancedness, individual rationality and robustness with respect to coalitions are then studied.
Introduction
A social choice rule is a correspondence that assigns to each profile of preferences that individuals might have a set of social alternatives or 'welfare optima'. A game (or mechanism) is said to implement a social choice rule if, for all profiles, the equilibrium outcomes of the game coincide with the welfare optima. Of course, the nature of the equilibrium outcomes depends on the solution concept adopted. In this paper, we shall concentrate on implementation in Nash and dominant strategy equilibrium.
The fundamental theorem on dominant strategy implementation is due to Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) . It states that with unrestricted preferences, if the social choice rule is single-valued (i.e., there is a unique optimum for each profile of preferences) and has a range of at least three alternatives, then it is implementable in dominant strategies if and only if it is dictatorial. This negative result was extended to pure exchange economic environments by Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979) (later referred to as *We are grateful to P. Champsaur and H. Moulin for useful suggestions.
03044068/82/000&0000/$02.75 0 1982 North-Holland DHM) and to more general, differential environments by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (198 1) . Because Nash equilibrium is a considerably weaker solution concept than that of dominant strategies, results have been more encouraging for Nash implementation. In particular, Groves and Ledyard (1977) showed that, in economies with public goods, games can be constructed whose Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal. Hurwicz (1979a) refined this result by insisting that the Nash equilibria be Lindahl equilibria. Maskin (1977) derived the general theorem that any social choice rule satisfying monotonicity and veto-proof conditions (described below) is Nash implementable.
In contrast with these optimistic conclusions, Roberts (1979) demonstrated, in an important paper, that, with unrestricted preferences, any single-valued social choice correspondence that is Nash implementable is also implementable in dominant strategies. In such cases, nothing is gained by substituting the Nash equilibrium concept for dominant strategies. The result was extended by DHM to any domain of preferences sufficiently 'rich' (defined below).
Although the assumption of single-valuedness is very strong, it has considerable appeal. Less satisfactory for many applications, however, is the hypothesis of a rich domain. In particular, the family of 'quasi-linear' preferences (defined below), used extensively in the public incentives literature, is not rich. In this paper, we explore the possibilities of Nash versus dominant strategy implementation for this family of preferences. In section 2, we define our terminology and review some of the existing literature. In the third section, we study Nash and dominant strategy implementation for an economy with convex, quasi-linear preferences over public and private goods. In this context, a social choice rule consists of a public decision function (a rule which assigns a level of public goods for each profile of preferences) and a vector of private transfer functions (rules which assign transfers of private goods to consumers for each profile). We find that although Nash and dominant strategies lead to the same class of implementable public decision functions, they imply rather different transfer functions. We characterize both Nash and dominant strategy implementable social choice rules. Finally, in sections 4, 5 and 6 we study collusion by coalitions and the possibility of implementing balanced and individually rational social choice rules.
Preliminaries
We consider an economy defined by a finite set of agents 1,. . ., n and a (nonempty) set X of social alternatives. Each agent i has a preference ordering Ri on X. Ri is assumed to belong to a family Bi of admissible preferences orderings. A social choice rule is a correspondence F which associates with each profile of preferences R = (R, , . . ., R,) (E nl= 1 S2Ti) a ( non-empty) subset A z X. One can interpret A as the 'best' alternatives or welfare optima given the preferences R. F is called single-valued if F(R) is a singleton for every profile R. A mechanism is a product n;= i Si of agents' strategy spaces and a function g: fi S,'X, i=l which specifies an outcome for any n-tuple of strategies chosen by agents.
A dominant strategy equilibrium of a mechanism g: nl= 1 Si+X for a preference profile R is an n-tuple of strategies (ST,. . ., sf) E ni Si which each agent i is willing to use regardless of the strategies chosen by others. 
Proof
Suppose that F satisfies the hypotheses of the theorem. Suppose that for some i, Ri, and RI # Ri, RI is a dominant strategy for agent i with preferences Ri in the game form that truthfully implements F. From (i) there exist R_i and x such that x = F (Ri, R-i) and such that the tangents to A (R,, x) and A(Rj, x) at x do not coincide. From (ii) there exists a unique hyperplane L that is tangent to at x. If L is not tangent to A(R:,x) at x, then because A(R:,x) is convex (RI is convex) the interior of A(Ri,x) intersects B. But this means that alternatives 'Actually, this is a bit stronger than necessary because it is not essential to rule out untruthful dominant strategies as long as they lead to the same outcome as the truthful one. However, the definition will do for our purposes.
preferred to x (under Ri) are attainable by varying Ri, contradicting Rj's dominance. Therefore Lis tangent to A(Ri, x) at X. Similarly, Lmust be tangent to A(Ri, X) at x, a contradiction of the hypothesized non-coincidence of tangents. Thus, Ri cannot be a dominant strategy after all. Q.E.D.
A Nash equilibrium for profile (R,, . . ., R,) of a mechanism g is an n-tuple of strategies (ST,. . ., s,*) 
Let NE,(R) be the Nash equilibria for profile R of mechanism g. Then g (partially) implements F in Nash strategies if, for all R, g(NE,(R))cF(R) and NE,(R) is non-empty. F is implementable in Nash strategies if VR, Va E F(R), there exists a g that (partially) implements F such that a E NE,(R).
To state the general theorem on Nash implementability, we need to define two additional properties of social choice rules. Monotonicity says that if an alternative x is welfare optimal for some profile of preferences and if those preferences are then altered so that x does not fall in relation to any other alternative in anyone's preference ordering, then x remains welfare optimal. No veto power requires that any alternative that is top-ranked (i.e., weakly preferred to all other alternatives) by all individuals but one be welfare optimal.
Monotonicity is a stringent condition. No veto power, however, is automatically satisfied in economic environments with non-satiation and private goods, since no two agents will agree that any given alternative (i.e., allocation) is top-ranked (each would like all of any private good to himself).
The theorem characterizing Nash implementability is:
Theorem 3 [Maskin (1977) ]. If F is implementable in Nash strategies, it is monotonic. Zfn 2 3 and F satisfies no veto power, the converse holds, and, moreover, there exists a mechanism g, such that NE,(R) = F(R) for all R.
In general, Nash implementability does not imply dominant strategy implementability, nor does the converse hold. Nonetheless, in one important special case -when preference domains are sufficiently rich and social choice rules are single-valued -the former implication does hold. To express richness formally, suppose that R and R' belong to the domain Wi. Let D,,,(R, R') be the set of orderings R" that are a-b monotone with respect to (R,R'); i.e., such that Vc E X, aRc+aR"c and bR'c+bR"c. W = fly= 1 Wi is rich or monotonically closed if Vi, VR, R'EB~, Vu, b EX, such that aRb-+aR'b and aPb-+aP'b, ai A D&R, R') #a. It should be clear that, for example, the unrestricted domain is rich and that trivially, so is any domain consisting of a single preference profile. It can also be shown [see DHM (1979) ] that the domain consisting of all convex, monotonic, and continuous preferences for private good is rich as well.
We can now state:
Theorem 4 [DHM (1979) ]. Zf the domain of preferences fly= 1 pi is rich and the social choice rule F is single-valued and implementable in Nash strategies, it is truthfully implementable in dominant strategies.
Theorem 4 leads us inevitably to the conclusion that if Nash strategies are going to get us any further than do dominant strategies, we had better turn to domains that are not rich -at least, if we maintain the hypothesis of singlevaluedness. It is worthwhile considering two important classes of non-rich domains.
Example 1. CobbDouglas preferences for two commodities.
In fig. 1 , two sets of indifference curves are drawn. The R, indifference curves correspond to the utility function X;Xi-', whereas the R, indifference curves represent XfXi-s.
If the domain of Cobb-Douglas preferences is monotonically closed, it must contain ordering R" such that, for all c, aR,c+aR"c and bRBc+bR"c.
But the former implication implies that R,= R" and the latter, R,= R", a contradiction.
Thus, the Cobb-Douglas domain is not rich. From Hurwicz (1972) we known that there is no dominant strategy mechanism that truthfully implements the competitive equilibrium correspondence of a Cob&Douglas exchange economy. On the other hand, this correspondence is monotonic and, vacuously, satisfies no veto power, so is implementable in Nash strategies (Theorem 3). Thus the non-richness of the domain does allow us to avoid the negativism of Theorem 3.
Example 2. Quasi-linear preferences for two commodities.
Consider utility functions of the form 4X,)+X,.
(Assume that 0 is concave and has a local maximum.)
Notice that the indifference curves for such a function can be derived from one another by vertical translations. Consider the sets of indifference curves, corresponding to two different u's In fig. 2 , the solid indifference curves correspond to utility function o,(X,)+X, (preference ordering R,) whereas the dotted curves correspond to u,(X,) +X, (preference ordering R2). If the class of quasi-linear preferences is rich (monotonically closed), then there must exist a third quasi-linear preference ordering R, such that , aR1c+aR3c, Vc, bR, c+bR, c. Because the R, indifference curve through b must lie on or above the R, indifference curve through b, the vertical distance between the R, indifference curves through a and b at point a must be less than or equal to d,, the vertical distance between the R, indifference curves. But because the R, indifference curve through a must lie on or above the R, indifference curve through a, the vertical distance between the R, indifference curves at point b must be at least d,, the vertical distance between the R, indifference curves. Since d, >d,, the vertical distance between the R, indifference curves cannot remain constant, contradicting quasi-linearity. Therefore, the class of quasi-linear preferences cannot be rich after all, and Theorem 3 is again not applicable. Indeed, we shall now see that with quasi-linear preferences the Nash and dominant strategy implementable social choice rules differ.
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Implementation and quasi-linear preferences
Consider an economy of n agents and two goods, one public' and one private. Suppose that the public good level can vary between 0 and 1. Let I/ be the class of all strictly concave differentiable functions on the interval [O, l] taking their maximum in (0,l). An agent with public good valuation VE V has preferences given by the utility function v(K) + y, where K is the public good level and y his consumption of private good. Let L be the class of all linear functions. We are interested in studying the implementation of single-valued social choice rules when preferences are drawn from K However, to facilitate our analysis, we shall work with the class I/* = Vu L.
Consider a social choice rule F from (V*)" into [0, l] x R". For (v 1,. . ., v,) E(P'*)", an element of F(v,, . . ., v,) is a vector (K, t,, . . ., t,), where K denotes the public good level and ti the transfer to agent i. We shall asume that F is single-valued when restricted to V". ' The restriction to a single public good is not essential (see the generalization after the proofs of Theorems 5 and 6). Let F,(u,, . . ., II,) = {K I3(t,, . . ., t,) with (K, t,, . . ., t,) E F(u,, . . ., u,)}. We shall also assume that F, is upper hemicontinuous (where the metric on V* is the sup norm on [0, l] 
3By 'semi-strictly increasing', we mean that if x &I, then h(x) > h(l).
4The converse is established only for the domain V". 5ui=(u1 ,...,Ui-l,V;+l,.~.,u,).
Note that the class of implementable public decision correspondences (that is, the class of first components of implementable F's) is the same regardless of whether the solution concept is Nash or dominance.
Furthermore, the public decisions are defined by functions of the derivatives of public good valuations.
If, in particular, h = X1= 1 liti:, then the public decision K maximizes XI= 1 iiui. However, because h depends only on the derivatives of the uis, a public decision which maximizes, say, Clilogvi, is not implementable. Nash and dominant strategies differ in so far as the kinds of transfers they can implement.
Nash implementation requires the transfers to be functions of the public decision and the derivatives of the public valuations. Dominant strategy implementation, on the other hand, makes an agent's transfer the sum of the two terms: a term depending on the derivatives of the public valuations and the public decision, and a term depending on the public valuation functions of other agents. For a given public decision correspondence, neither class of transfers is contained in the other, although the intersection of the two is non-empty. Under dominant strategy implementation, the transfers obtained in Theorem 5 correspond to the so-called Clarke-Groves mechanisms [see Green and Laffont (1979) ] when h is linear,
Another example in the case of two agents is
we obtain
The proofs of Theorems 5 and 6 will be aided by a trio of lemmas: But this last inequality violates IPM. Therefore, KS= I? for all s. By continuity, K E F&I,, v",, . . ., 6"). E F,(w,, . . ., w,) ]. In particular, $E F,(w,, . . ., w,). Let ($, t,, . . ., t,) E F(w,, . . ., w,). Suppose that, for (Cl,. . ., G,,) E C with fi1: > w;, F,(G,, . . ., i?,,) intersects (0,l). Then ~EF,(G,, . . ., 6"). For all i, choose vi E V such that vi($) = wi and u#) = 6;. Now, Vi is 'more concave' than wi at 4 in the sense that VKe[O,l], V<,<, wi(+) + 6 2 wi(K) + ;
(1)
where the latter inequality is strict if K #i.
Similarly, Vi is more concave than Bi at a,
where, again, the second inequality is strict if K #$.
If F is Nash implementable, then, from Theorem 3, F is monotonic. Hence, from (1) and (2) we conclude that since 3 E F,,(w, , . . ., wJ, 4 E F,(v, , . . ., u,) and since & F,(i&, . . ., fin), $E F&J, , . . ., u,). But F was assumed to be single-valued if its arguments lie in q a contradiction. Therefore, the lemma is established for a Nash implementable F.
Suppose, then, that F is truthfully implementable in dominant strategies. Let F be a single-valued selection of F satisfying IPM and such that f = F",(w, , . . ,, w,).
By an argument analogous to that of Lemma 1, 4=&u,, . . ., u,). Hence 
Proof
By definition of r/: u:(O) > 0 and uj( 1) < 0 for any vi E I/: Therefore, because h is semi-strictly increasing and because of (4), h(u;(O), . . ., u:(O)) >O and h@;(l), . . ., n u'(l)) < 0. From continuity, the semi-strict monotonicity of h, and the strict concavity of the uI)s, we conclude that {K ( h(u;(K), . . ., u;(K)) =0} consists of a single element K*. By definition of h, there exists (w,, . . ., WJEC such that $E Fo(wl, . . ., w,) and (w;, . . ., w;) =(u;(K*), . . ., ub(K*)). From Lemma 2, K*EF~(w~,..., w,). For each i, ui is more concave than wi at K*. Therefore, by argument completely paralleling that of Lemma 1, we conclude that K* E F,,(u, , . . , u,). Because F, is single-valued, {K*} = F,(u, , . . ., u,). Q.E.D.
From Lemma 3, we can already conclude that the public decision rules implementable in Nash strategies are the same as those implementable in dominant strategies. We are now ready for the proofs of Theorems 5 and 6.
Proof of Theorem 5. First suppose that F is implementable in Nash strategies. Consider (K, t,,.. .,t,,)~ F(u, ,. .,, u,) for some choice of (ur,.. .,u,)E I/". From Lemma 3, there exist (ri,. . ., t",) such that 
for any (fir , . . ., fin,) E V" such that q(K) = u;(K) for all i. Choose (UT,. . ., z(f) E I/" such that for all i, UT is more concave than either Ui or o"i at K. Then, by previous argument, (K, tl, . . ., t,), (K, Fl,. . ., <) E F(u:, . . ., I$). But F(u:, . . ., II,*) is a singleton. Thus ti = 6 for all i. We conclude that ti depends only on K and (u;(K), . . ., u;(K)), and so we can write ti=tt(K, u;(K), . . .,ub(K)).
These observations, together with Lemma 3, establish that Nash implementability implies the existence of functions h and tf satisfying (i), (ii), and (*).
Next, assume the existence of these functions. We will show that F defined by (*) is implementable.
By Theorem 3 it suffices to show that F is monotonic.6 Suppose that (K, t,, . . ., t.) E F(u,, . . ., II,) for some choice of (ul,. . ., u,) E V". Consider (I&, . . ., i?,,) such that for all R, i and 6, Vi(K) + ti ~ Ui(l?) + ti~v"i(K) + ti ~ v"i(l?) + ti.
As K E (0, l), (6) implies u:(K) = u":(K). Thus by (*), (K, t, , . . ., t,) E F(G, , . . ., 15~) . Thus F is monotonic.
That F, is upper hemicontinuous follows from (*) and the continuity of h. That F, is weakly efficient follows from (*) and the assumption that h(0,. . ., 0) = 0. F, is clearly neutral. Finally, F is single-valued on I/" from the strict concavity of the vi's and the semi-strict monotonicity of h. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 6. First suppose that F is truthfully implementable in dominant strategies. Assume that (K, t,, . , ., t,) E F(u,, , . ., u,) for some choice of (0 r,, . ., u,) E I/". From Lemma 3, K satisfies h(u', (K), . . ., u;(K)) = 0. Now, given the strategies of other agents, any two strategies of agent i that lead to the same public decision must result in the same transfer to him; otherwise, he would never choose the strategy leading to the lower transfer. Hence, if t** is i's transfer as a function of (ur , . . ., u,J, tf* depends on ui only through K, and we may write ti"*=tT*(K,u~i).
Take hi:R"-'-+I? as in formula (***) of Th eorem 6. Because UY ,(K) is decreasing in K and h is semi-strictly increasing, there exist K 1 and K, with 0 5 K 1 5 K, 5 1 such that hi(u'_i(K)) is non-decreasing if K E [K,, K,] and equal to zero otherwise (see the definition of hi). Thus hi is continuous almost everywhere, and so J$ h,(u'_ i(t)) dt is well defined.
Write t:*(R,U~i)=-jhi(U'-i(t))dt+Hi(~,U_3. 0 (7)
We must show that Hi is independent of K. Suppose that for any Gi, Fo(v"i, u _i) = {K}. Then we clearly can drop r? in Hi since I? can only be equal to K. Thus ' suppose there exist Vi and R #K such that R E F,(I?,, u-~). Without loss of generality, assume R > K. Because h is continuous, for all R E [K, rf] there exists iYi such that I?E F,(~",,u_~). From (7), we have for O<~<lf -K,
~~(K)-~h~(u'_~(t))dt+H~(K,u_~)
0 K+E
L ut(K + E) -S hi(U'_ i(t)) dt + Hi(K + E, 21 -J.
0 %I this framework it suffices to show that F is monotonic. 
Notice that (u:)'(K +~)=h~(u'-~(K +E)). Thus K +E E F,(z$, u-~). Hence
K+E
$(K+E)-j hi(u'Li(t))dt +H,(K +E, u-~)
0
1~~(K)-jhi(U~i(t))dt+Hi(K,U~i).
0
Rearranging, we obtain
K+E -[u~(K+E)-_~(K)]+ ~ hi(u_i(t))dt ~Hi(K+E,U_i)-Hi(K,v_i).
Dividing by E and letting E tend to zero, we have 
E-0 (11)
Combining (10) and (1 l), we obtain
Therefore Hi does not depend on K, as was to be shown. This observation together with Lemma 3 establishes that truthful dominant strategy implementation implies the existence of functions h, Hi and t:* satisfying (iii), (iv) and (**).
Next assume the existence of h, Hi and tf*. We will show that F defined by (**) is implementable. One way to do this is to verify that F satisfies IPM and apply Theorem 1. A more direct way is to observe that the right and left derivatives of (14) is non-negative. Thus K maximizes (12) and so truthfulness in a dominant strategy.
Finally suppose that h is strictly increasing. We must verify that F is strictly truthfully implementable. First observe that because h is strictly increasing, there existsv_iEV"-' such that K E Fo(vi, V-J if v:(K) is sufficiently close to zero [recall that h(0,. . ., 0) = 01. Hence if vi # q, we can choose K and v_~ such that u:(K) # q (K) and K E F,(q, v _ i) , establishing condition (i) of Theorem 2. For given v-iE V-l,
But, because h is strictly increasing, the right-hand side of (15) defines a differentiable curve.' Thus condition (ii) of Theorem 2 holds, and the theorem is proved.
Q.E.D.
Theorems 5 and 6 can easily be generalized to a public project space consisting of the m-dimensional unit cube [0, 11". Define K L, I/* and the terms 'weakly efficient' and 'neutral' by analogy with the one-dimensional case. Theorem 5 reads exactly as before except that h is now defined on R"" and the ti's are defined on [0, 11" x R"". Similarly, Theorem 6 remains exactly the same except that the hi's are defined on Rm(" l) .
Theorems 5 and 6 show that a Nash or dominant strategy implementable public decision rule corresponds to the set of roots of a continuous function that is semi-strictly increasing and satisfies h(0,. . ., 0) = 0. Thus for the case of two individuals it is easy to describe implementable public decision rules by the locus of roots of the corresponding h functions. Any implementable social choice rule must have an h whose locus of roots lies between those of hmin and h,,, which are depicted in figs. 3 and 4,
The decision rule associated with hmin is the dictatorship of the 'agent on the left', i.e., the public decision coincides with the smaller of the two agents' favorite choices. Similarly h,,, corresponds to the dictatorship of 'the agent on the right'. For n>2, we can also implement dictatorships of all other 'positions' (e.g. dictatorship of the median agent -majority rule). For a positional dictatorship ft hi (v'_ i(t) ) dt = 0 for any i, and therefore we can implement such dictatorships in dominant strategies with transfers that are independent of the public decision. In particular, we can take them to be identically zero, putting us in the [Moulin (1980) ] framework of single-peaked preferences over a single good. Fig. 5 depicts the dictatorship of agent 1 and fig. 6 the dictatorship of agent 2; in both cases transfers are independent of the public decision, as st hi (L i(t) ) dt z 0. The social choice rule corresponding to the h function in fig. 7 is a dictatorship by agent 2 as long as agent l's marginal valuation at agent 2's favorite choice lies between CI and /3. In this case transfers are independent of the public decision. For marginal valuations by agent 1 outside that range, the social choice rule chooses K to maximize u1 + u2 (the 'utilitarian' rule) and transfers of the Clarke-Groves form.
'We are implicitly assuming here that Hi is differentiable. This is justified because adding an arbitrary function of v-, to Hi does not affect incentives. In fig. 8 we represent a social choice rule that is a dictatorship by agent 2 if agent l's marginal valuation is sufficiently close to zero and otherwise a dictatorship by agent 1. Fig. 9 depicts a social choice rule that is a dictatorship by agent 2 as long as vi is positive, i.e., as long as agent 2's favorite public decision is smaller than that of agent 1, and the utilitarian rule otherwise.
Coalitions
Theorem 6 concerns implementation only in individually dominant strategies. That is, it ignores the possibility of collusion by coalitions. Returning to the abstract framework of section 2, we say that a direct revelation mechanism 
Proof.
Let us confine our attention to the subclass of valuations of the form 
and we can regard F as a function of (a,/? From (18), (19) and (21), we deduce a% aK
i3K aui aaj (22) From (16), a2vi/aK = Therefore for (c(, fi) =(oi, fi.
Balance
We know from Theorem 5 that for any Nash implementable public decision rule, balanced transfers (i.e., transfers which sum to zero) can be found that make the resulting social choice rule Nash implementable.
For example, transfers can be taken to be identically zero. On the other hand, Green and Laffont (1979) Proof.
For simplicity, we shall argue the case n = 2; the method of argument generalizes. We shall restrict attention to the class of valuation functions v,(K, ai, Bi, ei)= aiK -_iK2 + eiK3, ai,Bi>O.
Thus we may consider F as a function (since it is single-valued) of (c(,B, (3) = (cll, Bl, el, a2, B2, ez) .
In view of Theorem 6, balance requires that
Differentiating (23) Choose (&,fl, 9 , where F is differentiable and such that
Substituting (26) and (27) in (24), we obtain ah a%, ah a%, 3 -7+dv;aKZ au; azc ))
n&-g+{terms not involving $$}=O.
12
(26) (27) (28)
Now, suppose (29) is evaluated at (a, fl,@. If 8, and e2 vary starting from (0,) 8,) we can adjust c1 and p to keep avJaK and a2vi/aK2 constant. Therefore, (29) cannot hold in a neighborhood of (I?, fl, 0) unless h,+h,=O at (E,fl,@. 
and let If be the associated public decision level. Now, at R, for ~1~ >cC,, Therefore, for a2 slightly greater than a,, we must be on the horizontal segment, i.e., = (-b,ii) for some b>O.
From ( 
On the other hand, the same computation at the point (0,6--s) (obtained by varying the characteristics of agent 1) yields aH:
Therefore, max (u) h(0, a) = 0} = + 00 and so h(0, a) = 0 for all a > 0. By symmetry, h(a, 0) = 0 for all a 20. Thus F is the 'left' dictatorship.
Analogously, we would have obtained the right dictatorship had we assumed that h(O,a)=O for all a~[~?,01 for 5~0.
Individual rationality
A social choice rule is said to be individually rational if, for any profile of preferences, any outcome in the choice set yields each individual as much utility as from his initial position. In our framework, the natural assumption is to suppose that an individual with valuation v derives utility 0 from his initial position. Individual rationality is a desirable feature of a social rule because it ensures that no individual need be coerced into playing an implementing game form; all individuals will play voluntarily. Because valuation functions are bounded below, it is obvious that any SCR that provides sufficiently large transfers to all agents will be individually rational. However, it is natural to restrict attention to SCR's the sum of whose transfers is always non-positive, that is, tofeasible SCR's. As the following result shows, there is only one individually rational and feasible SCR (satisfying the hypotheses of Theorem 6) that is truthfully implementable in dominant strategies.
Theorem 9. Suppose that F is feasible and individually rational and satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 6. Then F is implementable in dominant strategies if and only if F is the left dictator.
Proof:
We shall argue the case of two agents, though our method extends to any number.
If Thus hI 20 everywhere and similarly h, 2 0 everywhere. Now for any ul, choose u2 such that for some K, u;(K) = u;(K) =O. Then, agent 2's transfer is Since u;(t) 2 0 for any t in [O, K] , h,(r&(t)) 5 0. Combining with above, we obtain h,(u;(t) =0 for tin [0, K] . Therefore agent 2's transfer is H, (u,) . Similarly agent l's transfer is H, (u,) . From feasibility H,(u2)+H2(u,)~0.
Thus, from the nonnegativity of the Ifi's we conclude that Suppose that a social choice rule F satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 5 and is individually rational and feasible. From feasibility, (iii) must be satisfied. For given vr,. . ., v, and for K* E F,(u,, . . ., u,,), choose 17~ E V* with Because q(K*) = u;(K*),
K* E F,(v"i, v-i).
Thus from individual rationality, establishing (ii). Summing (ii) over i, we obtain iil tt 2 -K* i$l 'JXK*).
Thus from (iii), i$l VW*) 2 0. Varying u,, we obtain (i). Thus (i), (ii), (iii) are necessary for individual rationality and feasibility. Conversely, suppose that F satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 5 and (i), (iii). From (iii), F is feasible. From concavity, vi(K) 2 Ku:(K).
Hence (ii) implies
Ui(K) + ti 2 Oy establishing individual rationality. Q.E.D.
Remark. Observe that if h =x1= 1 vi (so that the public decision K* maximizes x1= 1 ui)2 -i$'l Ku;(K) = 0.
Fig. 10
Thus if F is individually rational and feasible, ti = --K*u;(K*).
This choice of public decision and vector of transfers corresponds to the Lindahl equilibrium of the economy. That is, F must be the Landahl correspondence which is Pareto optimal, yielding a result analogous to Hurwicz (1979b) .
The h( .) functions satisfying Theorem 10 can be represented in the case of two agents as shown in fig. 10 . Any semi-strictly increasing h function whose zeros lie entirely in the shaded area corresponds to (in general many) feasible individually rational and Nash implementable social shoice rules.
Concluding remark. We have worked in this paper with a continuous project space (0,l). However, much of the literature on incentives and public goods concerns a discrete project space -where an indivisible project is either undertaken or not -Despite their apparent dissimilarity, the two approaches are not very different in terms of the results they yield. Indeed, all our theorems have almost exact discrete analogues, as comparison with the results of Laffont and Maskin (1981, sec. 3) establishes.
